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Reading the preface to the new edition of The Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, one 
might think that the battle over the status of aesthetics is over. According to the 
narrative of its editor Michael Kelly, aesthetics, held in generally low esteem at 
the time of the 1998 first edition, has now happily overcome its association with 
‘an allegedly retrograde return to beauty’, or its representation as ‘an ideology 
defending the tastes of a dominant class, country, race, gender, sexual 
preference, ethnicity, or empire’.1 The previously ‘rather pervasive anti-aesthetic 
stance’ of the 1990s passed away with that decade.2 Defined as ‘critical reflection 
on art, culture, and nature’, aesthetics is now a respectable practice once again.3 
The publication of the Encyclopedia’s latest iteration is a timely moment 
to review the current state of its much-maligned subject. The original edition of 
1998 faced major difficulties, with Kelly writing that his requests for 
contributions were greeted not only with silence from some, but also with 
responses from angry callers keen to tell him how misguided the entire project 
was.4 And according to some critics the fear of aesthetics in art and literary 
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theory has only increased since then. If an early moment in this alleged growing 
dissatisfaction with aesthetics is marked by Jean-Marie Schaeffer’s Adieu à 
L’Ésthetique (2000), a more recent one can be found in Steven Connor’s essay 
‘Doing Without Art’ (2011), where the opening lines of Jacques Rancière’s 
Aesthetics and its Discontents – ‘Aesthetics has a bad reputation. Hardly a year 
goes by without a new book either proclaiming that its time is over or that its 
harmful effects are being perpetuated’ – are said to ‘hum with promise’.5 
Claiming that no suitable account has ever been offered of the existence of that 
mysterious entity ‘the aesthetic’, Connor suggests that aesthetics needs to be 
abandoned entirely. Gone would be the experience of being ‘abstractly aware 
that we are responding to something that is art’, ‘of suspending one’s responses, 
or cautiously putting them in brackets’, and gone would be the angst that the 
thought of ‘doing without art’ has often given rise to.6 We should instead be 
sanguine about the possibility that a ‘whole subject area should simply be’, in the 
phrase of another more worried literary critic, ‘deleted’.7 
The pattern of argument found in Connor’s essay is telling in its focus, 
however. Rather than a direct attack on aesthetics as such, the main thrust of the 
essay is to take issue with the possibility of a definable idea of ‘the aesthetic’ that 
could feasibly underwrite a thing called ‘art’, along with dramatic claims for art’s 
power in thinkers like Slavoj Žižek, Giorgio Agamben, Rancière, and Alain 
Badiou. Even within its opening pages, the essay subtly shifts from initial talk of 
‘the distinctiveness of art and of aesthetic judgement’ and of the ‘definition of art 
or the aesthetic’, into talk of ‘aesthetic theory’ per se. Though critiques of 
aesthetics come in a number of forms, this slippage indicates a common move in 
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such arguments. Aesthetics is reduced to one or other arguably contingent 
associations, then dismissed wholesale on that basis.  
In this essay, then, I explore the fear of aesthetics in art and literary 
theory through an examination of common objections. My primary focus is the 
charge of ‘the narrowness of the aesthetic’, which as the most deep-rooted 
attack, is the one that I deal with at greatest length and with some examination of 
textual detail. (Given that the problems in many cases lie in longstanding textual 
controversies, foundational texts of aesthetic theory are read, as far as is 
possible, through subsequent commentators, rather than by taking them outside 
their histories of interpretation.) Two subsidiary charges levelled at aesthetics– 
equally important, but currently less prominent – are dealt with more briefly: the 
disengagement from politics and the neglect of art. In showing how many of 
these attacks come to contradict and undo one another I move towards a final 
section where I suggest there may be, literally, nothing to be afraid of. Undoing 
such fear, however, may not amount to a straightforward defence of aesthetics, 
for a redeemed aesthetics buys its newfound recovery and rejuvenation at the 
expense of a stable identity or subject matter. Aside from its additional extension 
to reflection on ‘nature’, there may in the end be nothing left to differentiate this 
apparently triumphant practice of aesthetics from a more general domain of art 
and literary ‘theory’. 
 
The narrowness of the aesthetic: a genealogy 
The primary theme in attacks on aesthetics is the idea that aesthetics trades 
solely in ‘the aesthetic’, or nothing but highly specialised forms of aesthetic 
experience. Connor’s article is a classic example, from within literary theory, of 
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the assumption that there is an inextricable link between aesthetic theory and 
the theorisation of aesthetic experience (as ‘the aesthetic’), and that without the 
grounding in the latter the former simply could not find a justification. The view 
of the aesthetic from which this line of argument takes off finds a more strictly 
art theoretical equivalent in Keith Moxey’s The Practice of Persuasion, where it is 
implied that an art history grounded in aesthetics would be one that reduces ‘the 
rich variety of human responses to art to a single kind of experience’.8 The 
attacks based on this theme might be summed up as saying that those interested 
in aesthetics assume a definable thing called ‘the aesthetic’ or ‘beauty’, that this is 
strictly sensuous and thus marked off entirely from cognition, and that the 
investigation of this is the sine qua non of ‘aesthetics’ as a practice. This is more 
or less what James Elkins identifies as the narrowest conception of aesthetics, 
‘shrunk to individual passages in Kant and to an identification with beauty’.9 
This view takes its support from a particular genealogy of aesthetics. It is 
relatively uncontroversial to say that it was Alexander Baumgarten who, in the 
mid-eighteenth century, coined the term ‘aesthetics’ to designate ‘the theory of 
sensuous knowledge’, and that Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement, at the 
end of that century, set aesthetics on its modern course by systematically uniting 
a generalising discussion of the arts with philosophising about knowledge of this 
kind.10 The more tendentious move in the genealogy is the suggestion that, under 
the influence of both Kant and eighteenth-century British aestheticians, 
aesthetics was from this foundational moment set up to deal primarily with the 
special questions of taste and judgement raised by the study of the aesthetic in 
relation to works of art. Conflating ‘aesthetic’ on the one hand as designating our 
response to certain ‘formal and sensuous properties’ of things in the world, with 
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‘aesthetic’ on the other as designating ‘pertain[s] to art qua art’, aesthetics had 
laid the ground for the notion that the distinguishing properties of art qua art 
simply were its ‘aesthetic’ or ‘formal and sensuous’ ones.11  
This reading of the tradition as it was taken up by twentieth-century 
theorists such as Clive Bell and Clement Greenberg has been aptly summed up by 
Paul Mattick Jr.: ‘Stemming from late Enlightenment and Romantic critical 
thought, [it] located the essence of art in properties of the artistic object – its 
ability to evoke an “aesthetic experience” in the viewer, above all its supposed 
“intrinsic perceptual interest,” what Bell called its possession of “significant 
form.”’12 A number of writers since have pointed out that the late twentieth-
century reaction against this ‘tradition’ was really a reaction against its 
corruption at the hands of those twentieth-century figures, Greenberg above all, 
with whom it had come to be synonymous. The result was either way the same. 
‘Kant’ and ‘aesthetic theory’ came to stand for nothing more than a kind of 
formalism that sought to identify art qua art through the ‘aesthetic’ experience 
generated by the immediately sensible configuration of its objects. By the 1980s 
and the highly influential Hal Foster-edited volume on The Anti-Aesthetic, this 
narrowing down of the purview of aesthetics had pushed many towards the view 
that any mention of aesthetics or ‘the aesthetic’ could only mean a reference to 
this way of thinking.13 According to the same view, an embrace of an ‘anti-
aesthetic’ stance was the sole way to move from Greenberg, formalist 
modernism, elitist conceptions of beauty, and the like, to a contextually minded, 
conceptually oriented, repoliticised view of what visual culture and its study 
might involve.14 
The narrowness of the aesthetic: an internal response 
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Such attacks call for both internal and external –i.e.,  ‘Kantian’ and ‘disciplinary’ – 
replies.  
Internally, it is not hard to show that those in the Kantian tradition (call it 
aesthetics in the ‘narrow, more or less Kantian sense’) are far more nuanced than 
this picture allows, as attention to its founding figure makes clearest.15 The basic 
error of the purist view of Kantian aesthetics is twofold, neatly indicated by Noël 
Carroll as the consequence of an illegitimate subsumption of the philosophy of 
art under an illegitimately narrow conception of aesthetics.16 Where earlier 
aesthetic theorizing tended to take natural beauty as the paradigmatic subject of 
investigation, later aesthetic theorists aiming at a characterization of art took 
these investigations and simply ‘transpos[ed] the theory of beauty onto the 
theory of art’.17 
Standing at the eighteenth-century origin of the tradition, Frances 
Hutcheson is representative in having taken the sensation of beauty to be 
something given immediately in experience, and as such to be ‘disinterested’ in 
the sense of entirely ruling out the possibility that it might comprise knowledge 
(‘interest’) of any kind. While Kant moved discussion of ‘beauty’ into the realm of 
the ‘aesthetic’ and ‘judgements of taste’, the definitively influential moment of 
the third Critique was nonetheless a discussion of the ‘free’ beauty found in ‘pure’ 
judgements of taste. The focus of such judgments was the ‘feeling of 
purposiveness or pattern’ afforded by the object, ‘without regard to [its] actual 
purpose or utility’ (in a way that would make contemplation ‘subservient to a 
consideration of practical concerns’), and that would as such result in a 
harmonious free play of the viewer’s faculties of imagination and 
understanding.18 For Kant as for Hutcheson, then, such judgments concerned a 
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pleasure taken in the immediate appearance or configuration of the object, to the 
real existence of which the viewer would be indifferent. When this kind of theory 
of beauty is taken as a model for defining art and what is expected from it, every 
consideration beyond the most restricted kind of immediate perception will 
inevitably fall by the wayside. 
 Crucially, while Clive Bell, Clement Greenberg, Monroe Beardsley and 
others may have made this move, earlier aesthetic theorists like Hutcheson and 
Kant never did. Especially telling in this regard is that when, in 1999, the then-
Editor of the British Journal of Aesthetics attempted to ‘bolster the credibility of 
philosophical aesthetics at the end of the twentieth century’, he found it 
necessary to begin with an attack on the historical misrepresentations that have 
come to afflict the Kantian grounds of aesthetics.19 For Lamarque, ‘Kant's 
position has become inextricably, though unfairly, bound up with extreme forms 
of aestheticism in art criticism that are often used to discredit it’.20 Such 
‘aestheticism’ is ‘exemplified by the fin-de-siecle "art for art's sake" movement 
and the writings of Oscar Wilde, James Whistler, George Moore, Clive Bell, and 
others’.21 As inclusion of the last name on this list suggests, ‘the extreme 
aestheticist conception, which cuts art off from all social, moral, or intellectual 
concerns’, is that which assumes the ‘inextricability of the aesthetic attitude and 
artistic formalism’. This tradition appears to have misappropriated ‘the Kantian 
aesthetic judgment’ as sufficient for all objects in the world, including works of 
art, and on this basis concluded that (in Bell’s famous words) ‘in order to 
appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge 
of its ideas or affairs, no familiarity with its emotions ... nothing but a sense of 
form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional space’.22 
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 Giving a qualified defence of the account given by Kant of the disinterested 
pleasure taken in pure judgements of taste, Lamarque usefully points to exactly 
how it is that the ‘position is so often distorted and misappropriated’. 
‘Disinterested pleasure’, on the basis of which we judge a thing beautiful and 
claim universal assent in doing so, derives from ‘contemplation of an object as it 
immediately appears to us, without regard to what kind of object it is or any 
desire on our part to make practical use of it’. This is a judgment that requires no 
thought of the ‘concept of the object’ or its ‘real existence’; it can be made 
‘without knowing anything about it or what kind of thing it is – its nature might 
be a complete mystery yet still be pleasing’.23 As Lamarque stresses, however, 
this account captures only ‘the logic of one kind of judgment, that such-and-such 
is beautiful’. When speaking of works of art, Kant denies that such a ‘pure 
aesthetic judgement’ is ‘appropriate or even possible’: judgment of a work 
involves knowledge of ‘what kind of object we are looking at’, including the 
concept the object falls under, and a conception of its ‘purpose’ and ‘perfection’. 
Kant’s discussion of fine art, according to Lamarque, ‘implies the need for 
“reflective,” even cognitive, judgement well removed from judgements of beauty 
alone’.24 A properly Kantian account of fine art, then, is far more nuanced and 
interesting than attacks on Greenberg and other twentieth-century writers have 
allowed. 
Though a relatively familiar point in aesthetics, this same argument has 
since been taken up outside of the discipline within theories of art more 
generally. Diarmuid Costello, for example, has recently made an attempt to 
recover the broadened Kantian account of fine art from its neglect at the hands of 
twentieth-century art theorists.25 Mindful of the critical reactions to Greenberg 
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amidst the post 1960s waning of formalist modernism and the rise of conceptual 
art, Costello sees the rejection of ‘Greenberg’ to have mistakenly resulted in a 
wholesale rejection of both ‘Kant’ and ‘aesthetics’ in contemporary art theory.26 
(The reduction of Kant’s theory of fine art to his theory of taste and aesthetic 
judgement is, Costello points out, something that has even influenced 
aestheticians as sophisticated as Arthur Danto.27) Costello instead highlights the 
stress placed by Kant on ‘aesthetic ideas’. Artworks ‘present concepts that may 
be encountered in experience, but with a completeness that experience never 
affords’, or they ‘communicate ideas that cannot—in principle—be exhibited in 
experience’. And they do so in such a way ‘that they imaginatively “expand” the 
ideas presented in virtue of the indirect means through which they are obliged to 
embody them in sensible form’.28 
Rather than engaging in the impossible task of a direct presentation of 
rational ideas in sensuous form, works of art thus present ‘aesthetic attributes’ of 
such ideas ‘in ways that provoke “more thought” than a direct conceptual 
elaboration of the idea itself could facilitate’.29 This ‘sensible, though necessarily 
indirect, embodiment’ of ideas’ generates in the viewer ‘a kind of free-wheeling, 
associative play in which the imagination moves freely and swiftly from one 
partial presentation of a concept to another’. The value of the work of art is thus 
not bound up with the contemplation of form, nor with straightforward 
representation, but in ‘imaginative engagement’ with (indirectly and sensuously 
embodied) ideas.30 Kant’s aesthetics are now revealed as perfectly suited to deal 
with the expanded field of contemporary art, for on this reading ‘many, if not 
most, artworks typically regarded as anti-aesthetic, according to the formalist 
conception of aesthetics that the artworld inherits from Greenberg, nonetheless 
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engage the mind in ways that may be thought of as aesthetic in Kant’s sense’.31 
This rejection of the formal in favour of ‘aesthetic ideas’ shows how easily the 
misperception of the Kantian account can be turned on its head. ‘Aesthetics’ 
emerges not as a problem for, but as the necessary ground for,  a coming to 
terms with conceptual or supposedly ‘anti-aesthetic’ art. 
  
The narrowness of the aesthetic: an external response 
The internal response rests on what is still a contested set of readings of Kant. 
The external response is even simpler, and should satisfy even those who reject 
the uncoupling of ‘Kant’ from the old idea of ‘the aesthetic’ as a unique and 
singular form of experience. In short, the link between present day aesthetics 
and the Kantian tradition that supposedly gave birth to it is partial at best.  
Revisionist examination of the style and concerns of those eighteenth-
century English and German thinkers  dealing with art and beauty has shown 
again and again how their key notions such as the ‘aesthetic’, ‘disinterest’, ‘art’, 
and the like were often very distant from, and in conflict with, present day 
concerns.32 Thus aesthetics as actually practiced today – in this section for the 
sake of clarity looking at just the analytic tradition – has had a series of fairly 
clear ruptures with the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century traditions of all 
kinds. As Rancière’s comment on the challenge to aesthetics from the 
‘supercilious champion of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy’ suggests, it was clear 
as early as A.J. Ayer’s sweeping critiques of aesthetics in his 1936 Language, 
Truth and Logic that analytic philosophy would force aesthetics to fight for its 
survival.33 Rather than sounding the death-knell of aesthetics , however,  the rise 
of analytic philosophy meant that the twentieth century rise (or rebirth) of 
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aesthetics in the UK and US was far more diffuse and harder to pin down than it 
might otherwise have been.34 While such famous names of the late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century as Bernard Bosanquet and Samuel Alexander had by 
mid century faded into relative obscurity, many more seemingly ‘traditional’ 
writers like Benedetto Croce, George Santayana, John Dewey, R.G. Collingwood, 
and even Herbert Read maintained their popularity, and were either directly 
published or regularly discussed in the pages of the journal of  the American 
Society of Aesthetics,  formed in 1939,  and of the  journal of the British Society of 
Aesthetics,  from 1960. 
Meanwhile, the response from analytic philosophy was less one of 
abandoning aesthetics as a practice than of trying to set it right. In 1951 John 
Passmore’s famous attack on the ‘dreariness’ of traditional aesthetics picked up 
the tone set by Ayer in 1936: if aesthetics was to have any future at all, it would 
need to abandon the tendency towards woolly generalizations about ‘art’ as a 
whole that led to ‘dreary and pretentious nonsense’.35 In the same decade 
William Elton’s Philosophy and Language marked ‘the first systematic and self-
conscious effort to bring linguistic methods of analysis to bear on aesthetics’, and 
now-classic papers of the decade by writers such as Morris Weitz (‘The Role of 
Theory in Aesthetics’ (1956)) and Frank Sibley (‘Aesthetic Concepts’ (1959)) 
showed the promise of this new direction.36 The idea of some unifying notion of 
‘the aesthetic’ attacked by Connor had (as he notes) been dismissed in 1956 by 
Weitz and branded ‘the first mistake’ of traditional aesthetics by William Kennick 
in 1958, while Passmore had already in 1951 suggested the same solution of 
abandoning analysis of ‘art’ as a whole in favour of a focus on individual 
practices.37 
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By the 1960s Arthur Danto and George Dickie were offering definitions of 
art that were in a sense ‘anti-aesthetic’ – as well as directly attacking the very 
concept of ‘aesthetic experience’ – and that focused not on inherent aesthetic 
qualities but on associated art theory (Danto) or ‘the artworld’ (Dickie) as the 
basis of artistic identification.38 1981 saw a landmark of sorts with the 
publication of Arthur Danto’s Transfiguration of the Commonplace, often said to 
have definitively steered the analytic philosophy of art away from the formalism, 
solipsism, aesthetic-cognitive binarism, and narrow readings of Kant that 
continued to plague it.39 And by 1989 it seemed to writers like Nelson Goodman 
and Catherine Elgin that the necessary ‘reconception of the subject, resources, 
and objectives of aesthetics…is what analytic philosophy provides’.40 (As a 
demonstrable sign of the openness of analytic aesthetics at this point, it is worth 
noting that the Analytic Aesthetics collection containing Goodman and Elgin’s 
essay included not just the literary critics Charles Altieri and Christopher Norris, 
but also Pierre Bourdieu on ‘The Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetic’.) 
Aesthetics revived via analytic philosophy would no longer ‘overlook the 
interpenetration of cognitive and aesthetic concerns’, it would reject the ‘attempt 
to police shifting and inconsequential boundaries’, and it would also dispense 
with the ‘dichotomies of subject and object, emotion and cognition, essence and 
accident’ that were previously ‘imposed a priori rather than derived from our 
encounters with art’.41 
 In the field of analytic aesthetics at present, where general or universal 
ideas of the aesthetic are not dismissed entirely, their use is often taken to 
preclude any reflexive tie to art or to grand powers claimed on its behalf. Such 
discussions either emphasize how extremely partial the concepts are to the 
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analysis of art, or they defend aesthetic experience as broad enough to include 
cognitive, moral, and other such properties.42 The ‘aesthetics’ of the everyday 
and of nature are fiercely debated without the implication that analysis under 
this heading could ever reduce to a narrow kind of beauty or aesthetic 
experience.43 Investigation can even extend to ‘non-perceptual’ artworks that are 
said to possess no perceptible properties relevant to their appreciation as art.44 
Many would now agree with suggestion that ‘philosophy of art’ and ‘aesthetics’ 
should be understood as distinct areas of enquiry, designating respectively the 
philosophical investigation of art and of our sensory being in the world.45 But 
what this misses is the stress aesthetics places on ways that, beyond narrow 
‘aesthetic experience’, the broader investigation of perception and experience is 
often crucial to the study of art or culture. What passes under the banner of 
‘aesthetics’ in Britain and the US at present thus includes an expanded study of 
the philosophy of art that, in its abandonment of the unquestioned tie of art and 
the aesthetic allows not only for the possibility that narrowly Kantian accounts 
of beauty and aesthetic experience are as ‘orthogonal’ or even irrelevant to such 
interests as one likes, but equally opens the way to the reintroduction of more 
open accounts of perception and experience at the heart of such study. 
 
The disengagement from politics 
The perceived narrowness of the aesthetic underwrites most charges that 
aesthetics is apolitical or politically suspect. This old or narrowly ‘Kantian’ view 
of aesthetics still held on to by those who see it as involving a ‘particular mode of 
authoritative aesthetic judgement’ – a model straightforwardly ‘derived from 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment’ – and so ‘do not believe the aesthetic approach to 
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visual culture, which inevitably cleaves to the connoisseurial tradition and 
perpetuates its authoritarian effects, to be a productive one at this moment in 
our cultural history’.46 The responses given above to the narrowness of the 
aesthetic suggest that this is now an anachronistic way to see things. But what 
more substantive consequences does the broadening of aesthetics have for its 
potential politics?  
There is now a standard narrative of the newfound political potential of 
aesthetics, moving from a politically motivated critique in  the 1970s to  the 
beauty-based recovery of the 1990s and to the ethical and political turns of the 
2000s.47 (Hal Foster’s reflective words on the 1983 Anti-Aesthetic seem relevant 
here: ‘I have to admit we totalized the aesthetic and reified it as a bad object for 
our own purposes. Mea culpa! But we were critics, not philosophers, in a very 
contested field of discourse and politics’.48) The Encyclopedia of Aesthetics now 
features not just a number of essays on politics and aesthetics, but a set of 
contributions highlighted by Michael Kelly as a sign of aesthetics being a 
‘discursive ally’ to politicised activity, wherein ‘male-gendered and white-
racialized aesthetic concepts (for example, beauty and the sublime), once 
deconstructed, can be embraced as forms of subaltern self-empowerment’: 
‘Decolonizing Aesthetics’, ‘Disability Aesthetics’, ‘Disinterestedness’, ‘Feminism’, 
‘Migratory Aesthetics’, ‘Negritude’, ‘Trauma’, and ‘Visual Culture’.49 (To which 
could be added the essays on a number of traditions outside of the West, on 
thinkers from Marx to Hélène Cixous, and on subjects from the ‘Canon’ and 
‘Sociology of the Artist’ to ‘Race’ and ‘Sexuality’.) 
The rise of the political turn in aesthetics has been linked to a widespread 
movement, especially in the realm of art and literary ‘theory’ practiced in 
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departments of English and Art History, towards post-Sartrean French thought 
in dialogue with the German aesthetic tradition .50 According to the narrative 
given by Peter de Bolla and Stefan Uhlig, this rethinking of aesthetics shifted 
attention from the old questions about the status of art objects and their place in 
an artworld to ‘speculative traditions of epistemology, politics, and ethics’.51 
Here, above all, it is the third Critique – ‘the Kantian übertext’ – that, transformed 
by a wide range of often competing accounts, has seemed to guide the way: 
 
The ‘aesthetic’ is no longer primarily an area of inquiry for artists, practitioners or even 
philosophers of art: it has become a bridgehead in our most recent attempts to 
reconceptualise – or perhaps re-colonize – politics, society, or the subject. Most 
especially, it is seen as providing or enabling the conceptualization of a counter to what 
is often viewed as the straightjacket of standard epistemology in which the rational 
enlightenment tradition has long been mired.52 
 
Those involved with this political or ethical turn in aesthetics are less likely to 
dwell on Kant’s accounts of beauty or art per se than on the ability of imagination 
and understanding to explore the richness of particulars without the need to 
subsume them under concepts. Aesthetics, including its acknowledgement of the 
singularity of the artistic or literary work, becomes the source of an alternative 
kind of reason and a form of resistance to ‘the determinate categories of 
instrumental rationality’.53 This form of strategy embraces the universalising 
consequences of the unity of aesthetics and artistic practices across the board – 
including the ‘communities of sense’ formed via the subjective universality of 
aesthetic judgement – for their fundamentally left-wing, emancipatory, 
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possibilities.54 (Even as critical a study as Terry Eagleton’s The Ideology of the 
Aesthetic ends with an appeal to what is shared in ‘human nature’ or ‘species 
being’ in order to ground a ‘materialist ethics’ that would also be ‘aesthetic’.55) 
This tendency ranges across philosophical aesthetics, across broader forms of 
cultural and communication studies, and across contemporary art world 
practices: from Alain Badiou’s Handbook of Inaesthetics and Rancière’s series of 
works on the politics of aesthetics (most recently Aisthesis: Scenes from the 
Aesthetic Regime of Art), to Jill Bennett’s Practical Aesthetics: Events, Affects and 
Art after 9/11, to the debates in the wake of Nicholas Bourriaud’s Relational 
Aesthetics.56 It is in large part due to this line of thought that it now seems 
natural not just to countenance arguments for an art-based ‘politics’ of 
aesthetics, but also for the ‘new’ aesthetics’ intertwinement with the ethical, or 
for an ‘aesthetic’ turn in political thought of various kinds. 57 
Much of this writing is nonetheless subject to Connor’s critiques of the 
‘numinous authority’ and implausible ‘political promise’ associated with a 
particular politics that attaches to ‘the aesthetic’ and the special idea of ‘art’ that 
goes with it.58 Given the internal and external replies to the narrowness of the 
aesthetic offered above, however, it would be wrong to totalize about this 
connection. If after all aesthetics can deal with the cognitive and can be 
pluralistic, then there is as little need for a quasi-Kantian recovery of ‘the 
aesthetic’ as a way towards the political as there was for the earlier ‘anti-
aesthetic’ stance of the 1980s. Figures such as W.J.T. Mitchell and Rita Felski 
have made clear that politically motivated practices of ‘visual culture’ and 
‘cultural studies’ can engage with aesthetics without endorsing narrow 
conceptualizations of art, beauty, and aesthetic experience.59 And even within 
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the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy, aesthetics is now no longer 
necessarily seen as either Kantian or universalist. Many scholars have long made 
the case for pluralism, constructivism, and even out and out relativism about 
interpretation.60 The feminist critique of universalist assumptions about taste 
and judgement, for example, is now a widely acknowledged part of the standard 
story of the development of aesthetics (being within rather than against 
aesthetics as it now exists as a practice).61 This anti-foundationalist and anti-
Kantian stance has been directly explored by at least one of the major figures in 
the ‘return to beauty’, Alexander Nehamas; both aspects are brought together in 
a quasi-pragmatist account of beauty and interpretation that  rejects  Kant and 
numinous ideas of the aesthetic for Nietzsche and a philosophy of beauty 
anchored in desire and the practice of lived human life.62 All these responses 
suggest that the problem does not reside in aesthetics per se, but in the error 
made by any ‘aesthetics’ that automatically assumes a politics tied to rereadings 
of the third Critique. Within the broadened conception of aesthetics, the rejection 
of an inherent politics of ‘the aesthetic’ can just as easily be made from from 
within aesthetics as from a position against it. 
 
The neglect of art 
The failure of aesthetics to actually engage with the objects of art and literature 
is an especially awkward charge to answer properly, given it seems like it may be 
constitutive of its difference from other disciplines. According to James Elkins, 
for example, the clash between general truth and historical particularity is often 
thought to define aesthetics in opposition to art history; ‘The argument concerns 
the nature of what is taken to be either irreducibly visual or ungeneralizably 
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singular about artworks. Art history would then be the discipline that clings to 
either or both possibilities, and aesthetics the discipline that abstracts or 
otherwise generalizes them’.63 Since these words were written in the mid 1990s, 
however, aestheticians have spent an increasing amount of time talking about 
artworks, often in highly sophisticated, historically informed, ways. This is 
especially true of analytic aesthetics where the standard ‘quasi-scientific 
dialectical method of hypothesis/counter-example/modification’ in many 
(though not all) cases necessitates the introduction of large numbers of artworks 
as examples.64 The more direct focus on the individual case is also commonly 
seen. The journals of the British and American Societies  of Aesthetics 
occasionally feature articles on artists or artworks that wouldn’t appear out of 
place in Art Journal or Artforum, while recent books like Aesthetics and the Work 
of Art or Introducing Philosophy of Art: In Eight Case Studies are a straightforward 
reflection of the trend towards grounding abstract theorising in concrete 
examples.65 
But this response is probably too easy. It might be more interesting to 
face head-on the proposition that aesthetics by definition isn’t about actual 
artworks – that once the balance of analysis shifts from a general theme or 
concept to the specifics of an artwork, then what is being carried out is 
something more like art history or art criticism. Support for this idea can be 
drawn from the fact that art history and literary studies as professional activities 
are alike in largely being ‘case’ based, with the standard form of an article being 
the focus on a single theme, period, author, or work of art or literature. An 
expansion from the single work to general rumination would then be a move 
from art history or literary study to art or literary ‘theory’ – or aesthetics. On this 
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basis it is unsurprising that, far from marooned on a separate island and barely 
able to understand those in aesthetics, as Elkins claimed, when in more 
generalizing mode art historians (including Elkins himself) can publish in the 
journals of the British and American societies of aesthetics, give keynotes at their 
conferences, and even win their prizes.66 This implies that practice and theory 
are two sides of the same coin, with aesthetics simply what art or literary 
historians are doing when the balance of their writing tips from the particular, or 
case-based, into a more generalising or ‘theoretical’ mode. Aesthetics is just the 
name for the ‘theory’ or ‘philosophy’ part of what art and literary historians do. 
 One would thus expect a deep dependence on aesthetics in art history, 
and this is precisely the case, as long as aesthetics is defined broadly and art 
history is not being written in an entirely positivist mode. When books like J.H. 
Bernstein’s Against Voluptuous Bodies: Late Modernism and the Meaning of 
Painting and Richard Wollheim’s Painting as an Art are placed on philosophy 
shelves and taught in philosophy or theory courses, while Rosalind Krauss’s The 
Optical Unconscious and Charles Harrison’s Painting the Difference: Sex and the 
Spectator in Modern Art are categorised as art history, the idea is that the 
primary goal of the former is something like a general account of ‘the conversion 
of the materials of painting into a medium, and the way in which this medium 
could be so manipulated as to give rise to meaning’, while the latter authors care 
most of all about the accounts of the particular artists and period offered.67 At 
the same time, books in the art history category are still likely to be dependent 
on theory, which they aim to refine in turn. In the case of Rosalind Krauss, this 
means her own take on the Greenberg-Kant tradition via Lyotard, Benjamin, and 
others, while in Harrison’s work a modified version of Wollheim’s philosophy of 
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painting forms the underlying premise of the entire book. If our whole 
understanding of an art historical period can rest on a particular reading of the 
consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology for the experience of 
sculpture, or on the ontology of art revealed by Duchamp’s readymades, then 
aesthetics is clearly not only the abstracting moment of art historical writing, but 
also its internal motor.68 
The ‘internal motor’ aspect here introduces one final problematic, 
suggested by the very name ‘aesthetics’, as distinct from ‘the philosophy of art’. 
In its original incarnation, we might remember, aesthetics was supposed to stand 
for the systematic investigation of sensory knowledge. This link with the sensory 
or perceptual suggests a rather different significance, as indicated by references 
to the ‘aesthetics of x’, where x might be anything from ‘the everyday’ to ‘exile’ to 
the individual artistic or literary work. Aesthetics here does not mean ‘involving 
aesthetic experience’ so much as ‘concerning sensory or perceptual experience’. 
(A point reinforced by the now widespread use of ‘affect’, stripped of its more 
technical origins, to serve as a less tainted stand-in for the sensory or perceptual 
moment of experience that ‘the aesthetic’ would elsewhere serve to designate.69) 
As such, aesthetics refers  less to generalizing about the nature of art or 
literature than to a discourse about the experiential moment in an encounter 
with a  work. 
It is to such a conclusion that sympathetic writers on aesthetics since the 
1980s have pointed, with calls for a reorientation via ‘a more serious 
engagement with the historical specifics of art’, or for an aesthetics ‘compelled to 
descend to [the level of individual works] to clarify and assess the claims about 
art that they embody. Philosophy and criticism become inextricably intertwined, 
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and both become bound to art history.’70 This conception of aesthetics as a 
dialectic of theory and critical engagement with the individual work has perhaps 
most openly been taken up in de Bolla and Uhlig’s aforementioned volume on 
Aesthetics and the Work of Art, which rejects the process of beginning 
interpretation with a pre-existing idea of what art is, and instead aims for an 
aesthetics that emerges in conversation with the work itself. Michael Kelly, also a 
contributor, sums up the way this process operates in de Bolla’s own writing:  
 
De Bolla begins with the materiality of the art work (support, size of canvas, pigment, 
etc.) that, when we encounter it, generates an affective experience indicating "the 
presence of an artwork." He adds that "it is only the work" – not aesthetic theory – "that 
stakes a claim to art"…To summarize, he has an encounter with an object and an 
affective experience, and then he is able to make sense of his experience by grasping the 
aesthetic grammar of this artwork, that is, a grammar unique to this work. From which 
de Bolla concludes: "Herein lies the common territory between aesthetics and the work 
of art: without the work this aesthetics would not be visible, still less required, and 
without aesthetics this work would be indiscernible, even unintelligible”…De Bolla 
insists that he can avoid the haunting circularity between aesthetics and the work of art 
because the conceptual grammar of a work of art can be articulated without any prior 
appeal to a general theory of art: "the claim that this object makes to artness is sui 
generis."71 
 
Aesthetics now fully emerges not just as concerned with the general, but also as 
necessarily engaged with the radically particular. It is not just the moment 
beyond art and literary history, but is also present at the all-important moment 
within them: the point when their objects are directly encountered and taken in. 
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A  truly ‘anaesthetic’ art or literary study would not only be one that eschewed 
aesthetic theorising, but one which refused to countenance the relevance of the 
thoughts and feelings the work gave rise to in the maker, viewer, or reader. For if 
aesthetics is broadened into ‘experience’ of a more generalised, at least partially 
cognitive sense, the analysis of the moment of experiential encounter with the 
work is simply the same thing as a concern with its aesthetics. 
 This insight has the interesting consequence that the most historically 
minded, and the most ‘literary’, of writers, can also be those who have the 
deepest engagements with the aesthetics of works of art. Imaginative, quasi-
poetic, art historical reflection like that of Michael Ann Holly, or art historical 
discussion deeply sensitive to the experiences the works give rise to like that of 
Richard Shiff, now explicitly emerges as art history inflected by, or in dialogue 
with, aesthetics.72 Looking backwards, one could recuperate a great many art 
historians to this aim. Amongst canonical figures a straightforward case would 
be Michael Baxandall, whose careful concern with historical reconstruction was 
said to be justified only in as far as it would ‘prompt other people to a sharper 
sense of the pictorial cogency’ of the work in question; ‘au fond’ the art historian 
was just that person found in every group of travellers or tourists ‘who insists on 
pointing out to the others the beauty or interest of the things they encounter’.73 
It would now make equal sense to recoup Edward Snow, a writer on art whose 
work has a strong feel of ‘practical criticism’ to it, and who is probably more 
often read in literature than in art history departments. In the opening pages of 
his book on Vermeer, Snow equates ‘aesthetic appreciation’ with ‘beauty’, and 
thus sees the former as an ‘instinctive step backwards’ that cannot but help 
retreat from the full range of intensities a richer relationship with the work 
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might involve.74 But though Snow does not acknowledge it, a broadened 
conception of aesthetics avoids this problem, just as it obviates Connor’s fear of 
‘suspending one’s responses, or cautiously putting them in brackets’, in the 
encounter with art. Snow’s writing itself is the ultimate example of how 
redundant such simplifications are [Fig. 1]: 
 
[The pearl’s] tear-likeness betrays, in the very place of art’s triumph, a reluctance and a 
powerlessness at the heart of art’s transformative urges. It condenses, renews, and gives 
visible form to the grief transcended in it. In this it is like Head of a Young Girl itself, 
where the author’s parental care for his creation, already overdetermined by the erotics 
of image-making, becomes implicated in an unwillingness to let go, to deliver over into 
iconicity and otherness. It is as if there can still be felt within the finished painting a 
conflict between the slow, loving, self-forgetful time of bringing it into being and the 
spectatorial instant of confronting it as an accomplished work of art, immaculate, closed, 
apart, abandoned at the threshold of life. A desire to remain lost in an open, endlessly 
prolonged act of creation fuses with the knowledge that painting is from the first an act 
of parting, and that those who make art are destined to confront not just love and new 
life but death, loss, and subjective isolation…In front of perhaps no other painting is 
there such a feeling that what one desires has been found. We lack only the means to 
reach.75 
 
The concern of this writing is to describe the experience offered by the work of 
art – setting down words on the interplay between ‘what is visible on the canvas’ 
and ‘what happens inside us as we look at it’.76 And finding this kind of  
vocabulary for affect – as de Bolla would have it –is as exemplary of a work-
centred aesthetics as it is of an aesthetics-sensitive art history.77 (For all its 
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apparent absorption in the immediacy of the work, there is still an overriding 
theoretical supposition about art developed in Snow’s writing, to do with the 
notion that ‘Something stays this way we cannot have,[/]Comes alive because we 
cannot have it.’78) Avowedly resistant to beauty and aesthetic appreciation as it 
may be, his whole project might be summed up with the same words that have 
recently been used to give the goal of a rejuvenated aesthetics: ‘the analysis of 
experiential or perceptual qualities of historically reconstituted artworks’.79 
 
Nothing to be afraid of 
At this point it looks like Kelly’s optimism may have been justified. Aesthetics 
does not reduce to simplistic questions of beauty, does not reduce ‘the arts’ to 
singular kinds of experience and judgement, and is a broad enough term to reject 
any strict binary that would rule the cognitive out of bounds, including socially 
and historically inflected forms of experience. Aesthetics also (even within the 
analytic tradition alone) deals with a great many issues into which ‘the aesthetic’ 
enters only partially if at all. One can be cautious about ‘the aesthetic’ or even 
reject it entirely, while still happily continuing to benefit from an interest in 
aesthetics. On these bases, there is plenty of room for ethics and politics, 
whether in relation to art itself or of the new political possibilities that thinking 
with the aesthetic opens up. It may even be the case that anti- or dubiously 
political stances on beauty and the like can only be properly countered from 
within the arguments of aesthetics. Finally, aesthetics as now practiced includes 
sensitive discussion of artistic practices of various kinds without the need to 
homogenise the arts, or even to abstract beyond the encounter with the 
individual work.  
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I want, nonetheless, to suggest in closing that this victory may come at a 
price, albeit one that happy pluralists can take to be the positive and necessary. 
At one point in ‘Doing without Art’, Connor recoils at the suggestion that his 
adumbration of a philosophy of fidgeting might be a step towards ‘an aesthetics 
of everyday life’, along with ‘the principles of emancipation, transfiguration, or 
resistance that such an aesthetic would underwrite’.80 On the terms of a 
rejuvenated aesthetics the error of this suggestion lies not in its appeal to 
‘aesthetics’ as such, but rather the subsequent assumption that this would 
involve particular theorists that would lead the project in a particular direction. 
What justification could there possibly now be, aside from laziness or habit, to 
appeal to Kant and reworkings of the third Critique, rather than to Michel Serres 
or another of Connor’s preferred thinkers?81 
 In short, in as much as it deals with art and culture the ‘new’ aesthetics 
buys its freedom from past caricatures or overly narrow concepts of the subject 
at the expense of anything that might differentiate it from cultural theory 
generally. Gone are all first principles and assumptions, above all the safety of 
the Kantian foundations, and the stable working definition of (or even belief in) 
entities like art and aesthetic experience. Rote appeals to the special powers of 
the aesthetic or art emerge now not as being bolstered by the practice of 
aesthetics, but as having got aesthetics wrong – as having mistaken an invitation 
to thought for a safe route along which that thought can proceed. Even attempts 
to distinguish ‘philosophy of art’ from aesthetics break down. Aesthetics appears 
to have an intertwining macro and micro function, standing not just for an 
abstracting tendency towards theoretical discussion but also for the kind of 
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analysis that deals with the specificity of the perceptual or experiential 
encounter. Aesthetics is now ‘critical reflection on art, culture, and nature’, at the 
same time that it is ‘the analysis of experiential or perceptual qualities of 
historically reconstituted artworks’. These two aspects revolve around and feed 
into each other, necessarily constituting the practice of aesthetics as it has been 
outlined here. 
On the logic of this recovery of aesthetics, wherever critical thinking 
about art and culture takes place, there may be no principled way left to 
differentiate between ‘theory’ and the form of aesthetics that has made the 
moves necessary to escape its various critics. Some will feel this dissolves the 
fear of aesthetics, whether about the deletion of a subject area, or of the stifling 
course its pursuit would entail. For others this will already be a dissolution or 
even deletion of the subject itself. Much now depends on the extent to which 
aesthetics can avoid the turn back to narrow Kantian roots or reductive notions 
of ‘art’ or ‘the aesthetic’, while at the same time leading to productive research 
that actively exploits its potential breadth and freedom. One strong possibility is 
that traditional ‘micro function’ concerns with perception and experience, 
bypassing the reductivist blind alleys, will give exactly this kind of impetus to 
distinctive and innovatory work on art and culture. Another is that ‘aesthetics’ 
will end up as no more than a catch all term for thinking about art, culture, and 
nature, and will have escaped its critics and rendered itself largely empty all at 
once. 
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